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17.1 Concepts and Problems
Although all forecasts are by their very nature probabilistic statements,
most economic predictions quote but a single value to be assumed by a certain
variable, without specifying the attached probabilities. Often many such point
forecasts are available for a given target variable from a business outlook sur-
vey. Ifthey show a high degree ofagreement, does this indicate that the fore-
casters confidently expect the outcome they commonly predict to come true?
More generally, does the dispersion ofthe point forecasts reflect their authors'
uncertainty (i.e., their relative lack of confidence)? This paper deals with
these and other related questions, drawing on a set ofdata that is very rare in
economics in that it includes related point and probabilistic forecasts from the
same sources.
17.1.1 Consensus
Averages from economic outlook surveys are frequently called "consensus"
forecasts or treated as such. The term has entered the popular discourse with-
out having been defined in a generally accepted way. But it is clear that the
degree to which a survey average is representative ofthe collected individual
predictions can vary greatly depending on the nature ofthe underlying distri-
bution. There may be no meaningful consensus ifthe distribution ofthe point
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forecasts in question is highly diffuse or multimodal because of large differ-
ences among the underlying models. On the other hand, a consensus would
be strongly in evidence for any unimodal, symmetrical, and sufficiently tight
distribution (see Schnader and Stekler 1979). The inverse aspect of the con-
sensus is the dispersion ofa sample ofpoint forecasts, which can be measured
simply by their standard deviation.
In predicting the value an aggregate variable is to assume in a given period,
individuals and groups use in part the same public information and the same
established techniques and relationships. The common elements induce some
positive correlation across the resulting forecasts. Insofar as the makers and
users of the forecasts interact and influence each other, directly or indirectly,
the correlation ofcorresponding expectations would be reinforced. That such
interdependencies may be substantial is suggested by the existence of infor-
mal exchanges and organized polls of opinion, market arrangements for the
sale of expert advice, and media dissemination of public forecasts. A fre-
quently encountered surmise is that many forecasters are risk averters who do
not wish to deviate much at any time from the views ofthe future that appear
to be prevalent. If so, the distribution ofthe approximately contemporaneous
point forecasts for a given target would be further tightened around an influ-
ential "consensus" value.
But there are also important limitations and countertendencies to this pro-
cess. Only the hypothetical expectations containing all the pertinent informa-
tion generated in the economy are necessarily self-fulfilling; actual forecasts,
even if widely shared, are not since they are inevitably based on partial and
imperfect knowledge. No mechanism has been discovered to ensure the con-
vergence ofthe forecasts to a unique and stable equilibrium path. Attempts to
predict average opinion or what others are likely to predict that average to be
and so forth run into the frustrating "infinite regress" problem. Certainly, gen-
uine predictions intended to guide the decision making or affect views in the
marketplace do not merely mimic one another. Thus simple averages offore-
casts from successive business outlook surveys have proved to be more accu-
rate over time, and also less biased, than most of the corresponding forecast
sets of the individual participants. Evidently there is a good deal of indepen-
dent information in the individual forecast series so that their collinearity is
limited, and combining them yields net gains in predictive power (Zarnowitz
1967, pp. 123-26; 1984a; 1985a).1
17.1.2 Uncertainty
In a number ofrecent studies, which are cited below, high (low) dispersion
of predicted price changes across survey respondents is interpreted as being
1. On methods to choose a diversified "portfolio" of forecasts and weights that reduce the
variance ofthe resulting composite, see Bates and Granger 1969 and Newbold and Granger 1974.
On the conditions under which unweighted aggregate predictions are optimal or nearly optimal,
see Einhorn and Hogarth 1975 and Hogarth 1978.494 Chapter Seventeen
indicative of high (low) "inflation uncertainty." Thus uncertainty is here
simply identified with the inverse ofwhat was labeled "consensus" in the pre-
ceding subsection.
It is important to recognize that this approach does not involve any direct
measurement of uncertainty in the usual sense of that term. The latter is a
function ofthe distribution ofthe probabilities that a forecaster attaches to the
different possible outcomes (values) of the predicted event (variable). The
tighter this distribution, the lower is the associated uncertainty.
For an informed outside assessment of uncertainty so defined, therefore,
some sufficient knowledge of the probabilities involved would seem neces-
sary. Inferences from point forecasts do not produce such knowledge; they
mayor may not provide helpful clues in its absence. When the standard devia-
tion of a set of corresponding predictions by different individuals is taken to
indicate uncertainty, the underlying assumption is that this interpersonal dis-
persion measure is an acceptable proxy for the dispersion of intrapersonal
predictive probabilities or beliefs held by the same individuals. The validity
of this assumption can by no means be taken for granted; it is an empirical
question that is best answered by direct measurement and testing.
Some events do have stable and known distributions ofoutcomes; others do
not. It is generally easier to predict stationary than nonstationary variables,
transitory than permanent changes, smooth trends than abrupt turning points.
The stabler and more knowable the underlying "objective" probability distri-
butions are, the greater presumably is the accuracy of the forecasts and the
confidence with which the subjective probabilities of the predicted outcomes
are held. The concept of uncertainty adopted here applies in principle to
any probabilistic forecast, whether held with a high or a low degree of confi-
dence. 2
Simple schematic diagrams suffice to show the important distinction be-
tween consensus and uncertainty and how the two may be related. In figure
17.1 the point forecasts reported by the individuals A, B, and C are viewed as
the expected values oftheir respective probability distributions. The degree of
consensus among the three (or any number of) survey respondents is said to
be "high" when their point forecasts are clustered, "low" when they are
widely dispersed. The degree of uncertainty is said to be high when the pre-
dictive distributions ofA, B, C, ... are diffuse, low when they are tight. As
illustrated in panels a and b of the figure, high consensus may be associated
with either low or high uncertainty. Similarly, low consensus may be asso-
ciated with either low or high uncertainty (panels c and d).
Suppose, however, that both uncertainty and consensus depend on the ac-
curacy record ofthe recent point forecasts. The better that record, the tighter
2. Thus no use is made in this paperofthe distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty" (Knight
1921; Keynes 1936), which has important implications in other contexts (chapter 2; Meltzer
1982).495 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
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(d) low consensus, high uncertainty (c) low consensus, low uncertainty
y
Fig. 17.1 Examples ofcontrasting combinations ofconsensus and uncertainty
Note: Curves A, B, and C represent the probability distributions ofalternative forecasts from
sources A, B, and C, respectively. The probabilities prob(y) are measured vertically; the
different values ofthe predicted variable (y) are measured horizontally. The point forecasts are
Yi' (i = A, B, C,...).
will be the individuals' predictive probability distributions and the smaller
will be the differences among their new point forecasts. In other words, fore-
casting successes should be associated with high consensus and low uncer-
tainty; forecasting failures, with low consensus and high uncertainty. If so,
then the combinations a and d in figure 17.1 would have higher probabilities
ofoccurrence than the opposite combinations band c.
Bomberger and Frazer (1981) tested the relationship between the dispersion
of the individual forecasts of inflation (J"t) and a weighted average of past
errors in these forecasts (Y"Sr), using data from a semiannual survey of eco-
nomic forecasters conducted by Joseph A. Livingston, a syndicated financial496 Chapter Seventeen
columnist. 3 They found a high positive correlation (r2 = .77) between the two
measures, which they argued supports the use of O't as a proxy for inflation
uncertainty. However, this result, though suggestive, is inconclusive. Past
forecast errors represent only one of the presumptive determinants of uncer-
tainty; others, more future-oriented, are at least as important. They include
the latest readings on the various influential indicators, the recent trends and
prospective shifts in economic policies, and changes in the external factors
affecting business and finance. Each of these is a source of signals that often
diverge and are subject to different interpretations, and hence ofuncertainty.
There is also a statistical problem here: the serial correlation oferrors from
the Livingston survey predictions could well account for much ofthe associa-
tion between O't and v'Sr. The predominant finding from a number of studies
of inflation forecasts is that they generally fail the conventional tests of un-
biasedness, efficiency, or consistency. 4
17.1.3 Hypotheses and Tests
For any time series, increased volatility tends to be associated with de-
creased predictability. Thus the more variable inflation is, the less ofit will be
anticipated. But when inflation rises to unusually high levels, it is likely to
become more volatile. Repeated policy attempts (a) to keep unemployment
low by stimulating spending and (b) to counter the resulting intermittent
bursts ofinflation inevitably produce monetary instability. People increasingly
realize how this process works, and so anticipated inflation will rise and be-
come more variable, augmenting uncertainty.
Extensions ofthis hypothesis attribute adverse real effects to such develop-
ments. High and volatile inflation raises frictions in the markets and lowers
productivity. Prior contracts delay adjustments toward shorter commitments
and more indexation. The effectiveness ofrelative prices in guiding and coor-
dinating economic actions is impaired as distinguishing signals from noise in
the observed absolute prices becomes increasingly difficult. These arguments
have been used in attempts to explain positive comovements of inflation and
3. Livingston's June and December columns, published in the Philadelphia Bulletin and the
Philadelphia Inquirer, refer to the levels of the predicted variables 6 and 12 months hence. The
initially published average forecasts contain frequent adjustments intended to allow for large
changes in the data between collection and publication. Carlson (1977) concluded that these ad-
justments cannot be justified, and he eliminated them by reworking the averages from the original
individual forecasts. The effective spans of the forecasts were now assumed to be 8 and 14
months. Subsequent research work generally relied on the means and standard deviations ofthe
Livingston forecasts in the form published by Carlson. Bomberger and Frazer used these data for
the 8-month forecasts in 1952-77. Their Sf measure is an average of squared past errors of the
individual forecasts with a geometrically weighted lag distribution.
4. On the evidence for the Livingston data, see Pesando 1975, Carlson 1977, Wachtel 1977,
Pearce 1979 and Figlewski and Wachtel 1981 (more favorable results are reported in Mullineaux
1978, 1980a). On the evidence from other surveys ofeconomists, consumers, and business exec-
utives, see also de Leeuw and McKelvey 1981, Gramlich 1983, and Zamowitz 1985a.497 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
unemployment rates as in the "stagflation" ofthe 1970s (M. Friedman 1977),
as well as the role of monetary shocks and price misperceptions in business
cycles (Lucas 1975, 1977).
Evidence from actual price index data on the whole supports the idea that a
positive relationship exists between the rate ofinflation and its variability over
time (R. J. Gordon 1971; Okun 1971; B. Klein 1975). Additional support
comes from international cross-section studies that suggest that countries with
higher average rates of inflation tend to have higher standard deviations or
mean absolute changes of inflation (Logue and Willett 1976; Jaffee and Klei-
man 1977; Foster 1978).
Wachtel (1977) shows that the inflation expectations ofeconomists and con-
sumers (collected by Livingston and the Survey Research Center of the Uni-
versity ofMichigan, respectively) have had large errors, mostly ofunderesti-
mation. Nevertheless, these data contribute to equations for consumption,
prices, wages, and interest rates when used along with other determinants (for
some qualifications, see de Menil 1977). Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) find
that for both of these surveys, the variance of inflation predictions across the
respondents increases with the variance ofmeasured inflation.
According to Mullineaux (1980b), the unemployment rate U
t falls with the
unexpected part ofthe current inflation rate, 1T~ = 1T t -1T~, and rises with (J't-i
and Ut - j , where 1T~ and (J't are Carlson estimates ofmeans and standard devia-
tions ofthe Livingston survey forecasts, and the lags i =0, ... , 11 and j =
0, . . . , 4 years. However, the interpretation of these equations is difficult
because of the use of long distributed lags in the presence ofhighly autocor-
related variables, notably U and (J'. The cumulative effects on U of (J' and,
especially, 1T" are weak in the sense that they require long lags to get signifi-
cantly large with the expected signs.
In Levi and Makin 1980, the percentage change in employment dN
t de-
pends positively on 1T~ and inversely on (J't. The equations yield significantly
positive correlations only when (J't is included. 5 Makin (1982) relates dNt , or
its counterpart for output, to "anticipated" and "unanticipated" money growth
rates, current and lagged, and to (J't-i' i = 0, 1. Again, inflation uncertainty
represented by (J' is found to act as a significant depressant (the other conclu-
sion is that anticipated money has substantial initial effects in stimulating real
economic activity). These studies do not rely critically on distributed lags and
are therefore more convincing.
Expectational data from the same surveys have also been used in several
recent studies of the determinants of nominal yields (it) on bonds free ofde-
fault risk. Here typically a reduced-form "Fisher equation" is estimated,
where i depends on 1Te, (J', and some factors affecting aggregate demand and
5. For 1948-75, however, the R2 coefficients are low, about .1-.2. For 1965-75, a period of
rising and more variable inflation, they are much higher: near or above .6.498 Chapter Seventeen
supply such as exogenous expenditures and money growth rates (or sur-
prises).6 Levi and Makin (1979), Bomberger and Frazer (1981), and Makin
(1983) present regression estimates that show that the interest rates are nega-
tively influenced by the current values of (J't or distributed lags in this variable.
However, Bamea, Dotan, and Lakonishok (1979) and Brenner and Lands-
kroner (1983) report positive coefficients of (J' orrelated proxies, while Melvin
(1982) has a positive but not significant coefficient, which he suggests may be
due to defects of the survey measure and the consequent errors-in-variables
bias toward zero.
These apparently contradictory results may merely indicate that the sign of
the effect of (J' on i is not clear. The argument is that inflation uncertainty
depresses both real investment and savings as borrowers and lenders are dis-
couraged by expected volatility of relative and absolute prices. If the impact
on investment dominates, the net effect of (J' on the after-tax real rate and
hence on i will be negative; ifthe impact on savings dominates, that effect will
be positive (Makin 1983).
The models under review are products ofthe 1970s, a period ofrising infla-
tion; it is not clear that they pass the test ofthe disinflation in the 1980s. The
sharp decline in actual inflation was accompanied by less volatility of price
change. There can be little doubt that it induced lagging but substantial reduc-
tions in expected inflation and presumably also in the associated uncertainty.
Yet, even when real growth was positive, the rates ofproductivity, investment,
and saving remained on the whole low in these years (puzzlingly so to many
observers), except for the strong but briefrecovery in 1983-84. Interest rates
declined generally but much less than inflation. 7 Recent attempts to explain
these developments rely on various special factors.
17.1.4 Further Steps
Evidently, economics of uncertainty is an important and active field of
study, with interest centering on inflation. 8 Just as clearly, there is as yet little
well-tested knowledge about it.
The approach to be followed here is to elicit information on uncertainty
from time series ofprobabilistic forecasts. Section 17.2 presents the data and
measures we have developed.
6. Some of these studies also consider the roles of taxes, real rates, and lags, whereas others
are limited to the gross effects on it ofnet and (J't orrelated measures. For comprehensive surveys
ofthe literature, see Tanzi 1984.
7. Note that the downward movement of the rates occurred entirely during the recessions of
1980 and 1981-82 as well as the slowdown after mid-1984; it was interrupted and partially re-
versed in the intervening recoveries.
8. Uncertainty about real growth prospects has received little attention in recent literature. The
effects of changes in the "confidence" of consumers, investors, and business people are often
emphasized, but these changes themselves and their determinants are extremely difficult to mea-
sure and analyze. What is needed here is probabilistic forecasts for real economic activity. Our
surveys provide such materials but only since mid-1981 (see sec. 17.2).499 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
Section 17.3 discusses the results based on these materials and compares
them with the results obtained by means of the point forecast proxies for un-
certainty. This is presumably the best way to answer the empirical question of
just how well the indirect measures have worked. The use of matched proba-
bilistic and point forecast sets allows us to examine directly how consensus
and uncertainty are related and also whether expectations of higher inflation
breed more inflation uncertainty (secs. 17.3.1-17.3.4). Next we explore ways
to bring together the measures derived from our series ofprobabilistic forecast
distributions and the measures derived from the Livingston point forecast
data. This cross-section analysis is then extended to reexamine the hypotheses
discussed above on how inflation uncertainty affects real economic activity
and inflation rates (secs. 17.3.5-17.3.7).
Section 17.4 sums up our conclusions.
17.2 Data and Measures
17.2.1 Properties ofSurveys and Samples
The survey conducted quarterly since 1968 by the American Statistical As-
sociation (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) is,
to ourknowledge, unique in regularly yielding numerical replies on predictive
uncertainty. A questionnaire, mailed to a broadly based and diversified list of
persons who are professionally engaged in the analysis of current and pro-
spective business conditions, asks for forecasts on a number of important
macroeconomic variables including the gross national product in current dol-
lars (GNP) and in constant dollars (RGNP) and the GNP implicit price deflator
(IPD). These predictions refer to the current and the next four quarters and to
the current and next year.
In addition to these point forecasts, the ASA-NBER survey provides prob-
abilistic forecasts for IPD and GNP (through mid-1981) and for IPD and
RGNP (thereafter). For each ofthe paired variables, a list ofpercentage inter-
vals (e.g., 10.0-10.9, 9.0-9.9, etc.) is included, with blank spaces to write
the numbers in. The replies represent the chances in 100 that the forecaster
associates with the changes falling in the selected intervals.
Although the numbers refer to annual changes, they come from quarterly
surveys so that the effective horizons ofthe predictions vary substantially. Of
principal interest are the probabilistic forecasts for the change from year t - 1
to year t that were issued in the four consecutive surveys from the last quarter
oft - 1through the third quarteroft. The distances between the dates ofthese
surveys and the end of the target year are approximately 4V2, 3V2, 2V2, and
1V2 quarters. We shall refer to these categories simply as horizons (H) 4,...
, 1. They account for the bulk of the more than 4,600 reported probabilistic
forecast distributions for 1969-81 and can be regularly matched with the
point forecasts made by the same persons for the same targets.(1)
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The total number of persons who responded to any of the 51 ASA-NBER
surveys taken during the period 1968:4-1981:2 is 192; the number of those
who participated in at least 12 surveys is 80. The latter subset of "regular"
respondents is the main source ofevidence in this paper, but we analyzed the
total set as well to make sure that the selection does not bias our results in any
particular way.
Data from the completed questionnaire forms available in the NBER files
were screened so as to (1) strictly match the probabilistic and point forecasts
made by the same persons for the same targets and (2) eliminate unusable
replies and obvious reporting errors. The last step improved the quality of
microdata in our sample but had minimal effects on the aggregate measures
obtained since the proportion ofthe forecasts excluded was very small.
The final collection for the group ofregular forecasters includes 1,673 and
1,705 individual probability distributions for GNP and IPD, respectively. The
shortest forecasts (HI) account for about 19% ofthese data, H2 for 27%, H3
for 28%, and H4 for 26%.9
17.2.2 Aggregate Probabilistic and Point Forecast Series
Summary statistics such as the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and
kurtosis were calculated for each ofthe individual probability distributions. 10
Uniform distribution within each ofthe selected intervals was assumed. Thus




IJ.~= ~ Pi k~ 1- k'+ 1 '
where Pi is the probability assigned to the ith interval (~iPi = 1), and 1iand Ui
are the lower and upper limits ofthe ith interval, respectively. Since unit inter-
vals are used, the mean (k = 1) reduces to ~iPJ(li+ui)/2]. The mean forecast
implicit in the jth respondent's probability distribution for horizon h and year
t will be denoted as <Pjht•
For each <Pjht there is a matching point forecast ~ht. The latter numbers are
computed from corresponding estimates and predictions of quarterly levels
of GNP and IPD. For example, in the fourth quarter of year t04' a respond-
ent would use data on the "actual" values of GNP in the preceding quarters
9. The probabilistic predictions issued in the second and third quarters of year t - 1 (H6 and
H5) and in the fourth quarter ofyear t (HO) are excluded. Such replies are available only for the
years 1974, 1980, and 1981. Also, only 136 (about half) of them have point counterparts. The
probabilistic distributions with the horizons of 6 and 5 quarters cannot be matched with point
forecasts at all, and those with the zero horizon lack interest since by the fourth quarter oft most
of the target year is already over. In addition, 210 faulty or unusable replies were eliminated by
editing the questionnaires for degenerate distributions with single "100" entries (116), cases in
which the probabilities do not add up to 1.00 (47), and mistaken applications to real rather than
nominal GNP (47).
10. The results reported below are not affected by skewness and kurtosis, and no use will be
made ofthese measures in this paper.501 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
(. . . A02' A03) and make predictions through the end of the year t + 1 (P04'
PII' .•. , P 14)· Accordingly, the annual percentage change forecast for any j
and t and for h = 4 is
(2)
Similarly, /3 made in the first quarter of the year t + 1 would equal the ratio
100(~1= IPij/~J= lAo), where the P's and A's are the new quarterly level predic-
tions and estimated realizations, respectively (note that P04 is now replaced by
A04). Still more recent predictions and estimates would be available for/2 (in-
cluding All instead ofPll ) and!l (including also Al2 instead ofP12).
The individual <p and!predictions are used next to construct annual time
series of group averages. Thus the means ofthe individual probability distri-
butions are averaged across all members of the sample for the given survey
as in
(3) L <pjht = <I>ht·
j




These steps produce 2 x 4 aggregate probabilistic forecast series and again 2
x 4 aggregate point forecast series (for GNP and IPD, and h = 1, . . ., 4, in
each case).
17.2.3 Regular and Occasional Forecasters
Whether or not the sporadic respondents are included makes hardly any
difference in terms of the aggregate results. For both GNP and IPD, the cor-
responding average measures in the total set and the regular set are extremely
close. This applies to mean forecasts, mean errors, and the overall dispersion
statistics for point forecasts and probabilistic forecasts alike, as demonstrated
in table 17.1, lines 5-6, 11-12, and 17-18. Correlations between the two sets
are so uniformly near unity, even after squaring and adjusting for the degrees
of freedom, that there is no need to list them. Suffice it to note that the f2
between the matched "all" and "12+" mean forecasts exceed .99 for either
variable at each horizon and that they are not much lower for the other statis-
tics. For example, the average f2 is .96 for the series ofstandard deviations of
the corresponding probabilistic forecasts.
The evidence from the ASA-NBER surveys presented below is based on
the forecasts by the "regular" respondents only, that is, those who participated
in 12 or more surveys. There are several good reasons for working with this
group. Earlier studies of the samples of individual forecasts from these sur-502 Chapter Seventeen
Table 17.1 Summary Statistics for Point Forecasts and Mean Probability
Forecasts ofAnnual Percentage Changes in GNP and IPD, 1969-81
Gross National Product Implicit Price Deflator
Horizon Point Mean Probability Point Mean Probability
(quarters)a Forecasts Forecasts Forecasts Forecasts
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Forecasts
1 1 8.8 (2.8) 8.4 (2.6) 6.6 (1.9) 6.6 (2.1)
2 2 8.9 (2.6) 8.8 (2.4) 6.2 (2.2) 6.4 (2.2)
3 3 9.0 (2.2) 9.0 (2.1) 6.2 (2.4) 6.4 (2.4)
4 4 8.7(2.1) 8.6 (2.0) 5.2 (1.8) 5.5 (1.8)
5 1-4 8.9 (2.4) 8.7 (2.3) 6.1 (2.1) 6.2 (2.1)
6 1-4 (all) 8.8 (2.4) 8.7 (2.3) 6.1 (2.1) 6.2 (2.0)
Mean Errorsb
7 1 -.44 (1.32) - .79 (1.14) -.19 (.47) -.22 (.54)
8 2 - .62 (1.13) - .73 (1.01) -.50 (.73) - .38 (.80)
9 3 -.64 '(.97) - .70 (1.01) -.72(1.13) - .52 (1.16)
10 4 - .88 (.85) -1.01 (.88) - 1.20 (1.42) - .92 (1.47)
11 1-4 - .65 (.18) -.81 (.14) -.65 (.42) -.51 (.30)
12 1-4(all) -.67 (.21) -.84 (.19) -.66 (.43) -.50 (.31)
Standard Deviationc
13 1 .39 (.11) .81 (.06) .34 (.21) .76 (.06)
14 2 .63 (.23) .91 (.07) .46 (.20) .83 (.08)
15 3 .90 (.31) .98 (.10) .68 (.34) .90 (.11)
16 4 1.14 (.22) .98 (.08) .70 (.19) .86 (.07)
17 1-4 .76 (.32) .92 (.08) .54 (.23) .84 (.08)
18 1-4 (all) .83 (.43) .94 (.08) .59 (.20) .84 (.08)
Note: All entries refer to the samples of regular forecasters except those in lines 6, 12, and 18,
which refer to the samples of all forecasters. Entries are means; entries within parentheses are
the corresponding standard deviations. All measures are in percentage points, referring to per-
centage changes at annual rates.
aHorizons 1, 2, 3, and 4 refer to forecasts ofchange from year t - 1 to year t made in the third,
second, and first quarters of year t and the fourth quarter ofyear t - 1, respectively; 1-4 refers
to forecasts for all four horizons combined. See n.14 and the text for more detail.
bEntries in lines 7-10 are averages ofthe series shown in fig. 17.1.
cEntries in lines 13-16 are averages ofthe series shown in fig. 17.2.
veys (see chapters 15 and 16) had to impose some minimum-response restric-
tions since the sporadic respondents could not be individually evaluated be-
cause of a paucity of data. The "12 or more" rule was used there to good
advantage, and the approach is followed here in the interest of consistency
and comparability. The elimination ofoccasional forecasts also has the advan-
tage ofreducing the variation ofthe coverage over time. 11
11. Many individuals responded only once or a few times, mainly to the early surveys. Each of
the 80 "regulars" had an adequate exposure: the range is 12-34 surveys, with a mean of23 and a
standard deviation of8. The numbers ofparticipants per survey in this sample average 41, with a
standard deviation of 10 and a range of21-60.503 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
17.3 Results
17.3.1 Mean Forecasts and Errors
Figure 17.2 shows a remarkably close agreement between paired series of
group mean errors of probabilistic and point forecasts and, by implication,
also between the corresponding mean forecast series. 12 Indeed, <l>ht and Fht
are highly correlated in each ofthe eight cases, with ;2 ranging from .881 to
.992 for GNP and from .981 to .995 for IPD. The matched series have very
similar average levels, as can be seen in table 17.1, lines 1-12.
This is a strong finding ofconsiderable significance. Evidently, the respon-
dents on the whole equated their preferred (point) forecasts to the expected
values (weighted means) of their predictive probability distributions. To be
sure, not all did so at all times, but a large majority did most ofthe time. Thus
large <f> - f discrepancies being well defined as exceeding 1percentage point,
only about one in four of the regular respondents had 20% or more of such
deviations on the record, and only one in twenty had 40% or more.
For unbiased forecasts, these results seem mildly suggestive ofsymmetrical
loss functions, but they are not inconsistent with bias or asymmetrical loss
functions for many of the individuals involved. Indeed, figure 17.2 indicates
that the surveyed forecasts are not free ofbias. Ofthe 46 mean errors ofprob-
abilistic predictions for GNP, HI-H4, 35 (76%) are negative; the parallel
count for IPD is 31/46 (67%). The proportions of underestimates among the
mean errors ofpoint predictions are'76% for GNP and 74% for IPD. Not only
are the underestimates more numerous than the overestimates, but they also
are visibly larger overall. On the average, the errors ofboth the probabilistic
and the point forecasts are negative for either variable at each horizon (table
17.1, lines 7-12). The absolute values of these mean errors tend to increase
with the horizon, especially for IPD, where the corresponding variability
measures do so as well (see entries in parentheses). 13
17.3.2 Series ofDispersion Measures
Figure 17.3 compares the series of the means of the standard deviations
calculated from the individual probability forecast distributions (s <f» with the
series ofstandard deviations for the corresponding sets ofpoint forecasts (sf).
For the GNP growth rates, S <f>> Sfin each year at HI and in all but two years
at H2, but the differences between s<f> and Sfare much smaller and less system-
atic at H3 and H4. For the IPD inflation rates, s<f> exceeds Sj as a general rule
12. Note that (<I>ht - At) - (Fht - At) = <l>ht - Fht. Also, for any group of respondents indexes
j = 1, ... , n, ~j(<f>.i - A) = <I> - A and ~j({, - A) = F - A (this applies to any hand t, so these
subscripts are omitted for simplicity).
13. Unlike inflation, which was heavily underestimated in this period, real GNP growth rates
were on the average overestimated, so that the quarterly point forecasts of changes in nominal
GNP show little bias (see chapters 14 and 16). However, the mean errors ofGNP forecasts for the
successive quarters, while small, are generally negative, and they cumulate. This produces much









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(with exceptions ofone year each at HI and H2 and two years each at H3 and
H4). The s4> series fluctuate much less over time than their Sfcounterparts.
Table 17.1 quantifies some of the inferences from these graphs (lines 13-
16). The s4> series (cols. 3 and 5) are relatively stable, as shown by the figures
in parentheses, and they increase only mildly between HI and H3. In contrast,
the sf series (cols. 2 and 4) are volatile and increase strongly and monotoni-
cally with the horizon from much lower levels at HI. The differences s 4> - Sf
are positive and relatively large in six ofthe eight categories (for GNP H3 the
difference is small; for GNP H4 it is negative).
Disturbances to aggregate demand and the price level come largely without
warning and are unanticipated; most are then followed by gradual adjust-
ments. There is a great deal of inertia and resilience in the economy, whose
normal condition is growth, and the agents-observers know it. It seems, prima
facie, unlikely that uncertainties about demand growth and inflation would
vary as widely and erratically from year to year as the sf series do, even in
turbulent times, and that they would differ so much across the horizons. What
can reasonably be expected is that increases in the volatility of change,
whether in spending or prices, will in time generate irregular upward drifts in
the corresponding uncertainties. The s4> series show in each case much less
variability than the sf series but also generally higher and more gently rising
levels. We find the behavior of s4> easier to rationalize with respect to the
presumptive measures ofuncertainty than the behavior ofsp
Our results thus suggest that consensus statistics probably often understate
the levels ofuncertainty. They may also overstate the variations in uncertainty.
Measures based on the probabilistic forecast distributions should be more de-
pendable on both counts.
17.3.3 Is Predictive Dissent a Symptom ofUncertainty?
Table 17.2 shows that a unit increase in Sfmay add only a fraction to s4>: the
regression coefficients are ofthe order of .1-.2, where they appear significant
at all (col. 4). The intercepts are all very similar, somewhat above .7 for infla-
tion, higher for the rates ofchange in GNP (col. 3). The Durbin-Watson statis-
tics are not very low, generally close to 1.5 (col. 5). Of the 12 correlations
listed, five are significant at the 1% level or better, which includes the results
from pooling the data across the horizons, and two others are significant at the
10% level; none of the rest presumably differs statistically from 0 (in four
cases f2 = 0).
The evidence, then, is mixed, much of it suggesting that sf and &4> are at
most weakly related. But this needs to be qualified by two observations. First,
all but two of the correlations listed (both for the shortest forecasts, HI) are
positive. Second, when larger samples are obtained by pooling and when
there are no missing observations (H3), the results rather clearly indicate a
positive association between sf and s4>. Thus there is some direct empirical
support here for what is often taken for granted, namely, that greater interper-
sonal differentiation ofexpectations is a symptom ofgreater uncertainty.507 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
The reasons why this support is not stronger may lie in certain offsetting
effects. Thus one can argue that it is precisely when uncertainty is high that
people will have strong incentives to reduce the risk of making eccentric er-
rors and will invest more resources in interactive prediction (see sec. 17.1.1).
To the extent that this is true, it would tend to make the individual expecta-
tions (point forecasts) more closely bunched at such times; that is, it would
produce elements ofinverse correlation between Sfand 5<1>'
A warning is in order at this point. Our findings are based on small samples
ofobservations. Pooling the data can help but is no substitute for longer series
of matching point and probabilistic forecasts. Collection and processing of
more information ofthis type should in time produce more conclusive results.
17.3.4 Inflation Expectations and Uncertainty
Our data permit direct tests of the hypothesis that changes in anticipated
inflation tend to cause parallel changes in uncertainty about inflation. This
idea plays an important role in theories that view rising (and high and volatile)
inflation as a major source ofadverse real effects (see sec. 17.1.3).
Table 17.3 shows that the regressions of inflation uncertainty measured by
5<t> on inflation expectations measured by <I> give results that are generally
consistent with the hypothesis. The effects of <I> on 5<1> are all positive, and
they are strong for all except the shortest (H1) forecasts, as shown by the t-
ratios on b, the Durbin-Watson statistics, and the correlations (lines 1-4, cols.
3-6). Pooling yields good results, too, especially when dummy variables are
used to capture the horizon effects (lines 5-6).
In contrast to this direct supportive evidence from the probabilistic forecast
distributions, the consensus measures from the point forecasts contribute little
here. The effects ofF on Sfare weak generally and apparently trifling for HI
and H2, although the correlations between the two variables are all positive
(lines 7-10). Pooling does not help, except for the significant horizon effects
(lines 11-12).
That higher <I> is associated with higher 5<t> for inflation does not mean that
a similar relationship should be expected to exist for GNP, which reflects
changes in total output as well as in the price level. There is no presumptive
reason why increased rates ofreal growth ought to induce greater uncertainty
about growth prospects, for example. Indeed, the correlations between 5<t> and
<I> for GNP are extremely low, with R2 = 0 for each horizon. The pooled re-
gressions show no significant effects of <I> on 5<t> either. 14 Much the same ap-
plies to the F and Sf series derived from the GNP point forecasts, where one
14. When dummy variables for the horizons are used, they alone contribute to the regression,
as shown by the following estimates:
Set> = .798 + .OOI4<f> + .099dz + .171d3 + .174d4,
(14.9) (.25) (2.8) (5.0 ) (4.9)













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 17.2 Relating Time Series ofStandard Deviations ofPoint and Probabilistic
Forecasts, Annual Percentage Changes in GNP and IPD, 1969-81
Regression Estimatesa Correlationsb
Horizon No. of Durbin-
(quarters) Observations a b Watson r f2
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gross National Product
10 .885 -.118 2.08 - .237 0
(12.5) (-.7)
2 2 12 .810 .157 1.64 .545** .226
(15.8) (2.0)**
3 3 13 .753 .255 1.03 .758* .536
(12.1) (3.9)*
4 4 11 .934 .044 1.48 .114 0
(6.3) (.3)
5 HI-H4, pooled 46 .764 .209 1.48
t .710* .493
(28.8) (6.7)*




7 10 .785 -.078 1.63 - .280 0
(21.2) (-.8)
8 2 12 .774 .120 .79 .295 0
(12.6) (1.0)
9 3 13 .772 .181 1.97 .534** .221
(11.9) (2.1)**
10 4 11 .736 .179 1.27 .467 .131
(9.0) (1.6)
11 HI-H4, pooled 46 .740 .182 1.59
t .525* .259
(27.0) (4.1)*
12 With dummiesd 46 .714 .131 1.56
t .606* .306
(23.1) (2.6)*
aThe regression equations are 5<1> = a + bSf (with the time subscripts omitted; there are no lags); t-ratios
are in parentheses.
bMultiple correlation coefficients Rand R2 appear in lines 6 and 12.
(The coefficients of the dummy variables H2, H3, and H4 (and their t-ratios) are .059 (1.8)**, .086
(2.2)***, and .049 (1.0), respectively.
*Significant at the 1% level for two-tail tests.
**Significant at the 10% level for two-tail tests.
***Significant at the 5% level for two-tail tests.
tExceeds the upper bound ofthe 1% point.
ofthe correlations is negative and only one (for H4) is positive and significant
at the 10% level.
17.3.5 Cross-Survey Analysis
The literature discussed in section 17.1.3 makes extensive use ofmeasures
based on the point forecasts ofinflation from the Livingston surveys. How are511 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction





(quarters)a a b Watson r ;2
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probabilistic Forecasts
.686 .011 1.56 .404 .058
(11.3) (1.2)
2 2 .600 .036 1.78 .954* .902
(25.4) (10.1)*
3 3 .620 .043 1.66 .887* .767
(13.6) (6.4)*
4 4 .660 .037 1.91 .869* .728
(16.5) (5.3)*
5 HI-H4, pooled .653 .030 .70 .647* .406
(18.6) (5.6)*




7 .218 .018 1.87 .167 0
(.8) (.5)
8 2 .383 .011 2.00 .130 0
(2.0) (.4)
9 3 .299 .061 2.50 . .432 .114
(1.2) (1.6)
10 4 .446 .049 2.72 .455 .119
(2.5) (1.5)
II HI-H4, pooled .415 .022 1.46
t .167 .006
(3.2) (1.1)
12 With dummiese .089 .376 2.30
t .599* .296
(.6) (2.2)
aFor the corresponding numbers ofobservations, see table 17.2.
"The regression equations are set> = a + b<t> for the probabilistic forecasts (lines 1-6) and Sf = a + bF
for the point forecasts (lines 7-12) with the time subscripts omitted (there are no lags); t-ratios are in
parentheses.
cMultiple correlation coefficients Rand R2 appear in lines 6 and 12.
dThe coefficients of the dummy variables H2, H3, and H4 (and their t-ratios) are - .077 (3.5)*,
.143 (6.7)*, and .139 (6.2)*, respectively.
eThe coefficients ofthe dummy variables H2, H3, and H4 (and their t-ratios) are .132 (1.3), .353 (3.6)*,
and .417 (3.9)*, respectively.
*Significant at the 1% level for two-tail tests.
tExceeds the upper bound of the I% point.
these data related to our series ofprobabilistic forecast measures? This ques-
tion clearly needs to be addressed, but the differences between the Livingston
and the ASA-NBER survey formats impede obtaining the answer.
One approach is to combine the Livingston forecasts made late in the year
t- 1 for the first half ofyear t with those made in the middle ofyear t for the512 Chapter Seventeen
second half. The resulting annual averages, called LIV6, are paired with the
means of the ASA-NBER forecasts with horizons H4 and H2 for year t, la-
beled ANB6. The component predictions of LIV6 and ANB6 have similar
dates, 15 but the targets ofthe former are semiannual and those ofthe latter are
annual. This complication is avoided by an alternative procedure, which is to
match the projections for t from the late t - 1surveys ofLivingston and ASA-
NBER H4 (we refer to these series as LIV12 and ANBI2).
For all these differences, plus the fact that the Livingston surveys aim at the
rate ofchange in consumer prices (CPI) while the ASA-NBER surveys aim at
inflation in terms ofthe IPD, the mean forecasts for LIV6 and ANB6 and for
LIV12 and ANB12 are highly correlated, as demonstrated in table 17.4, lines
1-2. Ofcourse, these associations are not quite as close'as those between the
F and <I> series within the ASA-NBER set.
More remarkable yet, the correlations between the Sfseries for LIV and the
S <t> series for ANB are rather high and significant at the level of 1% or less
(lines 3 and 4). There is more evidence here that low (high) consensus indi-
cates high (low) uncertainty than in the relationships between the Sf and S<t>
series within the ASA-NBER set as examined in table 17.2 and section
17.2.3.
It is true that the significance ofthese results is difficult to assess, given the
smallness of the available data samples. Pooling cannot be used here to alle-
viate the problem. The Durbin-Watson statistics are not very low, but the re-
siduals from some ofthe regressions appear to be positively autocorrelated.
In the ANB series used in table 17.4, H3 figures are interpolated in the
instances in which H2 or H4 figures are not available. However, to guard
against a possible bias from this procedure, alternative regressions were cal-
culated discarding all observations for which the H2 or H4 forecasts are miss-
ing. 16 The main results ofthis procedure for the equations sf= a + bS<f> are the
following: for LIV6-ANB6, b=5.600 (3.6); D-W=2.31, r=.784; for
LIVI2-ANBI2, b = 3.988 (3.8); D-W = 2.34, r = .788 (t-ratios and r signif-
icant at the 1% level in a two-tail test). Compared with their counterparts in
table 17.4, the values of the t-ratios and r are lower here and the Durbin-
Watson statistics much higher. The finding that the LIV Sfseries are positively
related to the ANB S <f> series remains intact, so the interpolations seem to have
little to do with it. 17
15. The Livingston midyear and end-of-year surveys are taken about a month after the corre-
sponding ASA-NBER surveys (see table 17.4, n. a).
16. This "classical least squares" method ofdealing with the problem of missing observations
is used throughout elsewhere in this study.
17. There is also no evidence that the interpolations cause any serious distortions in the other
equations estimated in table 17.4. Without interpolations, the t-ratios ofband r values are some-
what higher in lines 1 and 2, somewhat lower in lines 5-8, but all are still significant at the level
of 1% or less. The Durbin-Watson statistics are generally higher, exceeding 2.3 in all but three
cases, which suggests that the interpolations might have induced some autocorrelation in the resid-
uals from the regressions oftable 17.4.513 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
Table 17.4 Relating the Uncertainty and Consensus Measures for the ASA-NBER and
Livingston Inflation Forecasts, 1969-81
Regression Estimatesb Correlations
Durbin-
Survey Dataa a b Watson r ;2
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Forecasts (F, <f»
LIV6, ANB6 -.811 1.040 1.48 .937* .868
(-1.0) (8.9)*
2 LIVI2, ANB12 - .553 1.024 1.56 .956* .906
(-.9) (10.8)*
Standard Deviations (Sf' 54»
3 LIV6, ANB6 - 3.058 5.470 1.29 .849* .696
(-3.4) (5.3)*
4 LIVI2, ANB12 -1.854 3.480 1.50 .811* .625
(-2.7) (4.6)*
Standard Deviations on Mean Forecasts
5 LIV6 (Sf' F) .426 .217 1.73 .898* .789
(2.1) (6.8)*
6 LIV12 (Sf' F) .280 .169 1.78 .906* .804
(1.9) (7.1)*
7 ANB6 (54)' <f» .615 .040 1.63 .954* .902
(24.5) (10.6)*
8 ANB12 (54)' <f» .637 .041 1.17 .891* .774
(15.3) (6.5)*
aLIV6 are annual F and Sf series for inflation (CPI) based on forecasts from surveys taken in December
ofyear t - 1 for the first halfofyear t and in June oft for the second halfoft. LIV12 are corresponding
series based on December (t - 1) forecasts for year t. ANB6 are annual <f> and 54> series for inflation
(lPD) based on forecasts taken in November oft - 1and May oft for the yeart. ANBI2 are correspond-
ing series based on November (t - I) forecasts for year t.
bThe regression equations are of the form F = a + b<f> for lines 1-2, Sf '= a + b54> for lines 3-4,
Sf = a + bF for lines 5-6, and 54> = a + b<l> for lines 7-8. The F and Sf series refer to LIV6 and
LIVI2; the <I> and 54> series to ANB6 and ANB12. t-ratios are in parentheses. The numberofobservations
is 13 in each regression (for one missing observation in the H2 series and two in the H4 series, the
corresponding values of H3 are interpolated).
*Significant at the 1% level for two-tail tests.
What probably does help explain these results is that they are based on 6-
month and, to a larger extent, 12-month forecasts, omitting the shortest hori-
zon for which the association between Sfand S <t> may be much weaker, as table
17.2 would suggest. In any event, table 17.4 provides direct support for the
uses ofthe Livingston IT series as a proxy measure ofuncertainty. This seems
to be the first evidence of this kind, and as such it is both noteworthy and
favorable.
The last section of table 17.4 confirms that S<t> rises with <I> (cf. lines 7-8
and table 17.3, lines 1-6), but it also shows that Sf rises with F for both the
LIV6 and the LIV12 series (lines 5-6). The latter effects seem rather strong,514 Chapter Seventeen
which contrasts sharply with the evidence ofweak or no relationship between
standF in the ASA-NBER data (see table 17.3, lines 7-12).
Source: ANB: ASA-NBER surveys; LIV: Livingston surveys; DM, TBR, and DGE: Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis Handbook o/Cyclical Indicators, 1984.
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
aDM is the annual rate of change in the money supply, M1 (%); TBR is the 3-month Treasury bill rate;
DGE is the annual rate of change in the total of real federal government expenditures and real exports
(%); for the ANB and LIV variables, see the text and table 17.4.
bThe dependent variable is the annual rate ofchange in real GNP (%) (DY).515 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
tainty LIV12 sf are used instead of ANB 54> (cf. eqs. [5.1]-[5.2] with eqs.
[5.3]-[5.4]).
Reciprocal relations being ubiquitous in economics, the direction ofcausa-
tion is often difficult to establish: surely a prime example ofthis is that DYcan
affect DM as well as the other way around. But it makes good sense to argue
that uncertainty about future inflation can influence real activity adversely in
times of rapid and irregular rises in the price level (such as the 1970s),
whereas the reverse causation is implausible here. (Why should low DY in-
duce high o-?)
The t-ratios leave little doubt about the significance of the separate effects
ofthe DM and 0- variables, with a couple ofpossible exceptions that probably
reflect collinearity problems. 18 Jointly, these variables account for about .5-.7
of the variance of DY, depending on whether their lagged terms are included
(see theR2coefficients). Real defense and other federal government purchases
ofgoods and services are usually treated as an exogenous determinant oftotal
output ofthe economy, and the same applies to real exports. However, adding
the rate of change in real federal expenditures and exports (DGE) to regres-
sions with current and lagged values ofDM and 5<f> turned out to contribute
very little or nothing. 19 The variable DGEt was somewhat more effective (but
at some expense ofDMt) when used along with the sfseries, as illustrated by
equation (5.6). Also, there are some indications ofa negative influence onDY
oflagged interest rates (represented by the Treasury bill rate [TBR]), but they
too are somewhat sporadic,and weak (eq. [5.5]).20
In sum, the idea of inflation uncertainty as a short-term depressant of real
activity receives substantial support from table 17.5. The Livingston Sf data
provide on the whole a good proxy measure of0- in this context. These results
are consistent with recent studies. 21 They seem sufficiently robust to merit
cautious acceptance at this time, pending the accumulation ofmore evidence.
17.3.7 Effects on Interest Rates
Interest rates (i) represented by TBRt depend positively on expected infla-
tion <l>t and inversely on inflation uncertainty 54>t and money growth DMt, as
seen in table 17.6, equation (6.1). The lagged terms <l>t-l and S4>t-l enter with
18. The addition of ANB12s4>t_l results in a low t for DMt_ 1 and reduces the Durbin-Watson
statistics (which otherwise exceed 2). The addition of LIV12s/t_l results in a low t for DMt • The
correlations between s4>t and S4>t-l is .463, that between Sft and Sft-l is .618, and for DMtandDMt_ 1
the corresponding statistic is .410.
19. That is, neitherDYnor the coefficients ofthe othervariables were significantly affected. We
have also tried, with similarly negative results, a series ofshares offederal government purchases
and exports in GNP.
20. No further search for missing variables was considered necessary orindeed desirable, given
the pitfalls ofdata mining and our limited objectives.
21. See Levi and Makin 1980 and Makin 1982. It should be noted that this refers only to the
role of <t>t. Our calculations were not designed to deal with the issue ofanticipated versus unantic-
ipated money growth (me vs. m
U
); their outcome is consistent either with me having real effects or
with m
u accounting for the largest partoftotal monetary change.the same signs as their current-year counterparts, but they detract from the
effects ofthe other variables and contribute but modestly to regression (6.2).
When Ft and S/t are used instead of <I>t and S 4>t' coefficients with the same
signs are obtained, but the t, R, and Durbin-Watson statistics are all lower (cf.
eqs. [6.1] and [6.3]). The lagged terms Ft - 1 and Sjt-l' however, make rela-
tively strong contributions (cf. eqs. [6.2] and [6.4]).
These results suggest that the joint effects ofinflation expectations and un-
certainty on i have been very strong in this period. Leaving out S 4> or Sj and
including instead DGE or DY (with or without lags) reduces the correlations517 Consensus and Uncertainty in Economic Prediction
greatly. The influence of DM
t
- 1 turns out to be weak and ambiguous in its
sign.
The evidence of equations (6.1)-(6.4) supports the proposition that infla-
tion uncertainty (J' influences i negatively, which is consistent with three ofthe
recent papers that use the Livingston Sfdata for the same purpose. (Two others
report positive and one reports insignificant coefficients for the current and/or
lagged values of Spsee sec. 17.1.3.) A study by Lahiri, Teigland, and Zapo-
rowski (1986), using s<P-type data from the ASA-NBER surveys, finds posi-
tive effects that, however, are insignificant in the presence ofselected "liquid-
ity" and "exogenous demand" variables. 22
When the percentage divergence of actual from potential real GNP (GAP)
is added to the equation with current and lagged values ofthe LIV measures,
its impact on TRB is revealed as positive and strong. 23 The addition ofGAPt
diminishes the effect of DMt and eliminates that of Sft (cf. eqs. [6.3] and
[6.6]). That the impact of sfon TRB (as observed in earlier papers written or
coauthored by Makin) disappears when GAP is included has been noted by
Makin and Tanzi (1984, pp. 130, 134). In contrast to Sf' however, S <P retains
its significantly large coefficient with a negative sign in the presence ofGAP
(cf. eqs. [6.2] and [6.5]).
The upshot is that the balance ofthe evidence, with more credence given to
the probabilistic than to the point forecast data, favors the view that the effect
of a rise in (J' is to reduce i. As noted earlier, this implies that real investment
is depressed more than real savings in the process. However, this result needs
to be treated with caution since it could be quite sensitive to the choice ofthe
time period covered and other specifications.
17.4 Conclusions
We define "consensus" as the degree of agreement among corresponding
point predictions by different individuals and "uncertainty" as the diffuseness
of the probability distributions attached by the same individuals to their pre-
dictions. To be useful the distinction must be made operational and measur-
able. The quarterly ASA-NBER surveys provide data on point and probabilis-
tic forecasts of annual percentage changes in GNP and IPD, which can be
applied to this task in several ways.
22. The authors pool the survey data across horizons and combine them with quarterly series
for other variables. They use 3- and 6-month Treasury bill rates when the forecast horizon is two
quarters or less and 12-month rates when it is three quarters or more; the two situations are also
distinguished by means of dummy variables. The period covered is 1969:2-1985:2. Thus their
study differs from ours in several respects, and it is not clear what accounts for the discrepancy in
the results.
23. GAP is a cyclical factor, which is a broad measure of capacity utilization that affects real
investment positively via an accelerator-type relationship (see Tanzi 1980; Makin and Tanzi
1984).518 Chapter Seventeen
The matched mean point forecasts (F) and mean probability forecasts (<I»
agree closely. On the whole, then, the preferred predictions coincide with the
expected values ofthe probability distributions assessed by the survey respon-
dents.
Standard deviations ofpoint forecasts (Sf) tend to understate uncertainty as
measured by the means ofstandard deviations ofpredictive probability distri-
butions (s4»' particularly for short horizons. The sfseries show much greater
variability over time than the s 4> series, but the evidence suggests that these
measures of consensus and uncertainty are for the most part positively corre-
lated.
The Sfseries derived from the semiannual Livingston survey forecasts have
been widely used in recent literature as proxies for "inflation uncertainty."
This practice receives direct support from our finding of substantial positive
correlations between annual versions of these data and roughly consistent s 4>
series ofinflation based on ASA-NBER survey forecasts. However, matching
the data from the two surveys presents small-sample and other measurement
problems; hence the results ofthis analysis must be interpreted with particular
caution.
Strong positive effects of <I> on s 4> for the rate ofchange in IPD (but not in
GNP) provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that expectations ofhigher
inflation tend to generate greater uncertainty about inflation.
Real economic activity represented by the rate ofchange in constant-dollar
GNP is adversely affected by a rise in inflation uncertainty measured by s4>'
allowing for the influence of monetary growth and exogenous demand. The
Livingston sfdata produce similar results, in this study and others.
A rise in uncertainty about inflation, other things equal, can either reduce
or increase interest rates, depending on whether it depresses real investment
more than real savings or vice versa. Studies using the sfdata have produced
mixed results, interpreted accordingly. Our results indicate that a rise in s4> on
the average lowered the Treasury bill rate in the years 1969-81.